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TO: EUROPEAN BRIEF #170-75Y

1. SOVIET MILITARY PARADE MAY BE LESS MILITARY: THIS YEAR'S MILITARY PARADE THROUGH RED SQUARE C. NOVEMBER 7 MAY NOT INCLUDE THE TRACKED VEHICLES AND LARGE MISSILES NORMALLY SEEN IN THE PAST - KNOWLEDGEABLE SOURCES WHO HAVE OBSERVED TWO REHEARSALS SAW ONLY HALF THE AMOUNT OF EQUIPMENT OF PREVIOUS YEARS AND NONE OF THE LARGE PIECES. SUCH REHEARSALS USUALLY CORRESPOND CLOSELY TO THE PARADE ITSELF, ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS HAVE ON OCCASION DISPLAYED EQUIPMENT ON HOVEMBER 7 NOT SEEN IN REHEARSAL.Y

IF THE LARGE EQUIPMENT IS DELETED FROM THIS YEAR'S ANNIVERSARY EVENT, IT COULD MEAN THAT THE KREMLIN HAS DECIDED TO PLAY DOWN THE MARTIAL TRAP- . . PINGS OF THE CELEBRATION AND THEREBY BRING IT MORE CLOSELY INTO HARMONY WITH MOSCOW'S "PEACE PROGRAM." SINCE HELSINKI - SOVIET PROPAGANDA HAS MADE MUCH OF THE NEED TO COMPLEMENT POLITICAL DETENTE WITH A RELAXATION OF MILITARY TENSION.Y

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LAST YEAR, THE CONCLUDING CIVILIAN PORTION	0	IP FILE.	#.	
OF THE PARADE WAS ABRUPTLY CANCELED, OSTENSIBLY				
BECAUSE OF INCLEMENT WEATHER, BUT PROBABLY TO PRO-				
TECT THE HEALTH OF THE AGING SOVIET LEADERS ON THE	•	•		
REVIEWING STAND. THE RESULTING PREDOMINANCE OF				
MILITARY THEMES PROVOKED A FLURRY OF UNWELCOME		•	•	
WESTERN PRESS SPECULATION AND MAY HAVE PROMPTED A				
CLOSER LOOK AT THE FORMAT FOR THIS YEAR'S ACTIVITIES	Տ. Կ	ı		
MORE MUNDANE CONSIDERATIONS MAY ALSO HAVE				
FIGURED IN THE DECISION TO FORGO A DISPLAY OF HEAVY	• .			
EQUIPMENT THIS YEAR. THE SOVIETS MAY BE TRYING TO				
PROTECT RECENTLY RESURFACED ROADS ALONG THE PARADE				
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MIDDLE EAST AFRICA BRIEF 170-75.4

1. LEBANON: AS THE LATEST CEASE-FIRE GRADUALLY TAKES HOLD,
ATTENTION HAS SHIFTED TO FEUDING BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER KARAMI
AND INTERIOR MINISTER SHAMUN, WHICH NOW THREATENS POLITICAL
EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH THE CRISIS.4

THE UNEASY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO LEADERS HAS SHARPLY
DETERIORATED AS A RESULT OF KARAMI'S ACCUSATIONS THAT SHAMUN'S
NATIONAL LIBERAL PARTY WAS PARTIALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MOST RECENT.
ROUND OF FIGHTING. KARAMI HAS ALSO TAKEN OVER SECURITY
RESPONSIBILITIES PREVIOUSLY HANDLED BY SHAMUN, INCLUDING THE
NEGOTIATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LATEST CEASE-FIRE. THE
PRIME MINISTER WILL HOLD A CABINET MEETING TUESDAY TO GAIN MAJORITY
APPROVAL OF THE NEW TRUCE IN AN APPARENT EFFORT TO HEAD OFF
ANTICIPATED CRITICISM FROM SHAMUN.Y

THE DEEPENING RIFT BETWEEN KARAMI AND HIS MINISTER WILL UNDERMINE EFFORTS TO REVIVE THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE COMMITTEE, WHICH WAS SCHEDULED TO MEET MONDAY AFTER TWO WEEKS OF INACTIVITY.

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PAST QUARRELS BETWEEN KARAMI AND SHAMUN HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFULLY MEDIATED AND IN THIS INSTANCE, PRESIDENT FRANJIYAH AND OTHERS ARE APPARENTLY TRYING TO WORK OUT A RECONCILIATION. THERE IS NOW TALK, HOWEVER, THAT SHAMUN WILL RESIGN FROM THE CABINET. OBSERVERS IN BEIRUT BELIEVE THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ONLY EFFECTIVE SPOKESMAN FOR CHRISTIAN INTERESTS WOULD FURTHER ERODE THE AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNMENT AND WOULD PROBABLY TRIGGER ANOTHER ROUND OF SERIOUS FIGHTING. ESCERETH

THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL SINCE THE LATE 1950S ARRIVED AT THE ISRAELI
PORT OF EILAT EARLY TUESDAY. EGYPTIAN AUTHORITIES BARRED THE
PR 15 FROM COVERING THE SHIP'S PASSAGE THROUGH THE CANAL ON
SUNDAY, CONTENDING THAT THEY FEARED SABOTAGE ATTACKS BY RADICAL
ARABS OR PALESTINIANS WHO OPPOSE THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI ACCORD.
A MORE LIKELY EXPLANATION IS THAT CAIRO WISHED TO AVOID EXTENSIVE
PUBLICITY, AND PARTICULARLY WANTED TO KEEP ARAB PRESS COVERAGE
OF THE EVENT TO A MINIMUM. {CONFIDENTIAL} E-2 IMPDET.H

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE BRIEF 170-75.4

ARGENTINA: ARGENTINE PRESIDENT NARIA ESTELA PERON'S LATEST
HEALTH PROBLEMS COULD GIVE SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS A CHAPCE TO
SOOTHE POLITICAL TEMPERS FOLLOWING THE CONTROVERSIAL APPOINTMENT LAST
HEEK OF ANIRAL DEMARCO TO THE POST OF SOCIAL HELFARE MINISTER. 4

PTROB IS REPORTED TO HAVE A GALL BLADDER DIFFICULTY, BUT SHE IS KNOWN TO USE PHYSICAL ILLNESS AS AN EXCUSE UHEN UNDER ENOTIONAL STRAIN. IF SHE DOES HAVE A GALL BLADDER DISEASE, SURGERY MAY BE NECESSARY, WHICH COULD REMOVE HER FROM THE SCENE FOR AT LEAST A MONTH. SHE HAY HAVE ONLY GASTROINTESTINAL SPASHS, WHICH COULD RESPOND TO TREATMENT IN A FEW DAYS. MOST POLITICAL LEADERS WILL WELCOME PERON'S ASSENCE AGAIN.Y

DEMARCO, TRYING TO DISASSOCIATE HIMSELF FROM THE DISCREDITED
LOPEZ REGA, HIS FORMER SUPERIOR, HES PROMISED A CLEAN SUEEP OF SENIOR
OFFICIALS WITHIN THE MINISTRY TO ELIMINATE CORRUPTION, AND HAS ALREADY ACCEPTED THE RESIGNATION OF ONE OFFICIAL-Y

THE ARGENTINE CONGRESS IS CONTINUING ITS EFFORTS TO OBTAIN A FULL DISCLOSURE OF FINANCIAL MISDEALING UNDER LOPEZ REGA IN THE HOPE

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OF DISCREDITING PERON'S ADMINISTRATION AND GIVING HER THE ALTERNATIVES OF IMPEACHMENT OR RESIGNATION.Y

HILITARY OPPOSITION TO THE PRESIDENT IS MARDENING. BUT THERE IS
NO EVIDENCE THAT ARMY COMMANDERS ARE PLANNING AN IMMEDIATE MOVE
AGAINST HER. Y

IT IS CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT SOME ARMY CORP COMMANDERS THINK THAT MILITARY INTERVENTION WOULD BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO END POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY. {CONFIDENTIAL} E-2 IMPDET-4

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TO: EAST ASIA BRIEF 170-754

1. CAMBODIA-THAILAND: CAMBODIAN DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER IENG SARY
AND HIS THAI HOSTS IN BANGKOK HAVE APPARENTLY ESTABLISHED A FAVORABLE
ATMOSPHERE FOR FUTURE CONTACTS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. Y

THE AGREEMENT TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WAS PROBABLY PARTICULARLY GRATIFYING TO THE THAI, WHO HAVE THUS FAR MADE LITTLE PROGRESS IN RESOLVING THEIR DIFFERENCES WITH THE VICTNAMESE OR THE LAO. THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE'S VAGUE FORMULATION ON THE TIMING OF AMBASSADORIAL EXCHANGES——AT A CONVENIENT DATE "DEPENDING ON PREVAILING CONDITIONS"——CONFIRMS, HOWEVER, THAT THE CAMBODIANS ARE NOT ANXIOUS TO PERMIT THAI DIPLOMATIC EMISSARIES IN PHNOM PENH. "

THAI AGREEMENT TO THE PLEDGE THAT BOTH PARTIES WOULD NOT ALLOU

THEIR TERRITORY TO BE USED FOR HOSTILE PURPOSES AGAINST THE OTHER WAS

PROBABLY INTENDED TO ALLAY CAMBODIAN FEARS OF THAI GOVERNMENT SUPPORT

FOR RESISTANCE GROUPS OPERATING IN THE BORDER AREA AGAINST CAMBODIA.

FOR THEIR PART, THE THAI MAY INTERPRET THE STATEMENT AS A

CAMBODIAN EXPRESSION OF NONSUPPORT FOR THAI INSURGENTS.4

THE COMMUNIQUE DID NOT REFER TO THE REFUGEE ISSUE, ALTHOUGH

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THAT THE REFUGEES RETURN TO CAMBODIA. THIS PROBLEM MAY BE HANDLED
BY LIAISON OFFICES DUE TO BE ESTABLISHED ON THE BORDER FOLLOWING
FUTURE TALKS. ACCORDING TO THAI FOREIGN MINISTER CHATCHAI. THE
LIAISON OFFICES WILL ALSO HANDLE BORDER TRADE. SUGGESTING THAT
THE CAMBODIANS WILL EVENTUALLY PAY LOWER PRICES FOR MUCH-NEEDED RICE
AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS THAN THEY DO NOW FROM PRIVATE TRADERS. THAI
OFFICIALS HAVE REPORTED THAT THE CAMBODIANS REFUSED THAI AID OFFERS.
BUT DID AGREE TO NEGOTIATE A SYSTEM OF BARTER TRADE.

ACCORDING TO CHATCHAI. THE CAMBODIANS DID NOT RAISED THE ISSUE OF AIRCRAFT AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT TAKEN INTO THAILAND AT THE TIME OF THE COMMUNIST TAKE-OVER. THE CAMBODIAN WILLINGNESS TO TAKE THE FIRST STEP TOWARD NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH THAILAND. WITHOUT MAKING RETURN OF THE EQUIPMENT A PRECONDITION. IS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF PHNOM PENH'S INDEPENDENT STANCE VIS-A-VIS ITS INDOCHINESE NEIGHBORS. BOTH THE VIETNAMESE AND THE LAO INSIST THAT THIS ISSUE BE RESOLVED BEFORE ANY SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT CAN BE MADE IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH THAILAND. ESECRET) E-2. IMPDET.H

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